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PANEL III
CONGRESS, THE COURT, AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK*
Our bifurcated panel this morning will discuss Congress'
power and duty to construe and to enforce the Constitution.
The first pair of speakers, Jonathan Macey and Virginia Seitz,
will discuss the differences between economic and noneconomic freedoms, and our second pair of speakers, Gary
Lawson and Walter Dellinger, will discuss Congress' powers
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Federalist Society allows the moderator the small
liberty of saying a few words to get the panel going. I thought
that I would motivate the first of these topics, the difference
between noneconomic and economic liberties, by reading an
excerpt from an under-appreciated article by someone who,
until this year, has been under-appreciated by the public. The
man's name is Ronald Coase. He is famous now for having
won the Nobel Prize in Economics this year and for having
written the article, The Problem of Social Cost,' which began in
a serious way the discipline of economic analysis of law.
These are certainly not the only achievements in Professor
Coase's long career. He wrote an article in 1977 with the
highly misleading title, Advertising and Free Speech.2 The title is
highly misleading because the article has little to do with
advertising but everything to do with the difference between
speech, a noneconomic liberty, and other economic liberties.
Listen to what Coase had to say:
Belief in free speech is embodied in the First Amendment:

"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press ....
The clear purpose of the First
Amendment is to limit severely the power of the government to
regulate what has been termed the market for ideas-broadly
speaking, what is written or spoken. In words that have often

been quoted, and with approval, Justice Holmes described the
fundamental belief which finds its expression in the First
Amendment. It is that "the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
Moderator. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior

Lecturer, The University of Chicago Law School.
'Ronald Coase, TheProblem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
'Ronald Coase, Advertising and Free Speec, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1977).
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power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market." A statement such as this displays an extreme faith
in the efficiency of competitive markets and a profound distrust
of government regulation. The First Amendment prohibitions on
government action have received, and continue to receive, the
strongest support from the intellectual community.
This same intellectual community has, of course, in general
been very anxious that the government should extensively
regulate activities not covered by the First Amendment and rarely
a day passes without new proposals for further regulation. This
striking difference in the policies espoused when dealing with
speech or written material, which I will refer to for shortness as
the market for ideas, and those which are thought appropriate
for the ordinary market for goods and services is clearly something which calls for an explanation. It is not easy to find.
In the market for ideas, consumers are assumed to be able
to choose appropriately between what they are offered without
serious difficulty. As Milton said (and this has been repeated
many times since) "Let [truth] and falsehood grapple; who ever
knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?" But
in the market for goods, we do not seem to believe that consumers are able to make such a fine discrimination and it is deemed
necessary to regulate producers with regard to what they tell
consumers, how goods are to be labelled and described, and so
on, lest consumers make the wrong choices. It is perhaps merely
an extension of this assumption about consumer behavior in the
two markets that whereas in the market for goods, producers are
thought to be unscrupulous in their dealings, in the market for
ideas fraud is not treated as a serious problem-which is at least
consistent, since in a market in which consumers effortlessly
detect false claims, what motive could there be for politicians,
journalists or authors to attempt to make false or misleading
statements?
But perhaps even more extraordinary is the difference in
the view held about the government and its competence and
motivation. I assume that support for the First Amendment
prohibitions on government action-and the support is widespread-is based on beliefs about what the effects would be if the
government intervened in the market for ideas. It seems to be
believed that the government would be inefficient and wrongly
motivated, that it would suppress ideas that should be put into
circulation and would encourage those to circulate which we
would be better without. How different is the government
assumed to be when we come to economic regulation. In this
area government is considered to be competent in action and
pure in motivation so that it is desirable that it should engage in
the regulation, in the minutest detail, of the goods and services
which people buy, the terms on which they buy, the price which
they can pay, from whom they should be allowed to buy, and so
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on. Since we are concerned with the activities in these two
different markets of the same government, why is it that it is
regarded as incompetent and untrustworthy in the one market
and efficient and reliable in the other?

Professor Coase goes on to give an extended answer to that
question. He concludes that there is no difference in the
competence and reliability of the government in those two
markets-that the government is incompetent and unreliable
in both.
I have brought Coase to mind merely to set the stage for
our first two speakers. I am confident that they will have views
somewhat different from those expressed by Professor Coase.
JONATHAN R. MACEY'
I am pleased to be here today to speak about the difference between economic and noneconomic rights. However,
as long as we have someone on our panel as talented and as
interesting as Frank Easterbrook, I would like to say something
that will hopefully re-engage him in the discussion during the
question and answer period. During both his opening remarks
and his invocation of Ronald Coase's views about the shifting
and perhaps nonexistent distinction between economic rights
and noneconomic rights, my mind went to one of Judge
Easterbrook's articles called The Constitution of Business, which
was published a few years ago in connection with a Federalist
Society symposium and which includes some comments about
substantive due process. Substantive due process, of course, is
the Supreme Court doctrine of the 1930s that provided a set
of constitutional protections for economic liberties such as the
freedom of contract. Ijust happen to have judge Easterbrook's
article with me and would like to read an excerpt from that
article:
Substantive due process is dead, we buried it in 1937. The
Supreme Court then held that Congress and the states may
regulate the business as they please. No more claims that the
Contract Clause gave bankers the liberty to work for a pittance
or mine operators the privilege to sign workers to yellow dog
contracts. Scarcely'anyone mourns the absence. All know, then,
s Id. at 1-2 (citations omitted).
Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
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there are good and bad reasons to regulate business. Which is
which has been left to political actors. The regulation of personal
liberties would receive close attention after 1937, the regulation
of economic activity would receive none.'

So far, this excerpt is just an uncontroversial depiction of the
current status of constitutional jurisprudence. Judge
Easterbrook then says-and here is the controversial part
about which I would like to challenge him and my co-panelist,
Ms. Seitz-that "you may praise or regret this state of affairs.
I happen to think that it is fine."2 I hope that Judge Easterbrook's introductory remarks suggest a recantation of those
views, but perhaps not. In any event, that issue is now on the
table for more detailed discussion later.
The first question that I want to address this morning is a
very basic question that, as I continue to study public choice
and constitutional law, strikes me as something that is very
poorly understood. That question involves the proper definition of "rights." Before we can understand or can even begin
an inquiry into the distinction between economic liberty and
noneconomic liberty, we must have some idea of what rights
are. I want to at least try to come up with a definition upon
which we can all agree. While such an attempt is not an easy
task at a Federalist Society convention, the task is perhaps
easier than creating a definition upon which everyone universally could agree. I would suggest that if the term "rights"
means anything, it means a sphere of activity that we are
privileged to enjoy without the fear of intrusion. This definition of "rights," I would suggest, creates a dual responsibility
for government. The first responsibility for government is to
operate so as not to interfere in that area of activity that has
been carved out as existing within the sphere of rights. The
second responsibility that this definition of "rights" creates for
government is to protect those rights. If I sign a contract with
one of you in this room to perform something and if I do not
perform my end of the bargain, we all know that you can take
me to court to seek vindication of your rights. Therefore, the
government should act as a mechanism that not only does not
' Frank H. Easterbrook, The Constitutionof Business, GEO. MASON U. L. REV., Winter
1988, at 53.
2 d. at 54.
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intrude on people's rights but also actually enforces those
rights.
Obviously, people can disagree about what kinds of things
fall within the sphere of rights that I have just defined. Clearly,
people who argue on both sides of the abortion issue or any
other issue have different conceptions of what falls within and
without that sphere of rights. However, I would suggest that
my definition of "rights" still adds something to our stock of
knowledge. A mere look at the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
on voting rights reveals that the Court has grappled for
decades with the issue of how to treat governmental efforts to
deal with voting rights, such as residency requirements and
polling rules. As a ritualistic incantation in its voting rights
opinions, the Court says that voting is a fundamental right
because it is necessary to protect all other rights. In my view,
that description by the Court explains how poorly we understand the idea of rights; if something really is a right, then one
does not need voting to protect it. For example, if one has the
right to contract with another, then one has the right to
engage in that activity without fear of governmental interference. If one has the right to assemble, then Congress, by
virtue of interest-group pressure, majoritarian will, or any
other reason, cannot decide to deprive anyone of that right.
If Congress possesses such a deprivation power, then the right
to assemble is not really a right in the first place.
One of the objectives of this panel is to address Congress'
duty to avoid incursions upon property rights. If we view
property ownership as a right, then the question that this
panel is charged with addressing is admittedly self-responsive.
Beyond this admission, I have several important things to add
about the issue of rights. As far as Congress' responsibility to
protect people's rights from governmental intrusion, I believe
that the Framers did not trust human instinct or judgment
very much. Admittedly, this view is itself a ritualistic incantation at these Federalist Society events, but it is a view always
worth repeating. The Framers planned to protect rights by
creating a constitutional structure of checks and balances
along with other various provisions of federalism. These
provisions would operate together so that, after the period of
constitutional creation, the system would protect rights
through a rule of law and a constitutional structure.
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Two reasons support the creation of these constitutional
provisions. First, as detailed in The Federalist No. 10,' enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm; therefore, we
cannot trust the ordinary political process to the vagaries of
shifting public opinion. In fact, we really need a system that
will operate to counter the excesses of faction. A second
reason, which forces us to directly confront the distinction
between economic and noneconomic rights, is one that is not
given as much attention as I think it deserves. Every time that
an interest group, an individual, or even a virtuous uprising of
the people attempts to exert its own vision of the good on
everyone else, no matter how benign or well-intentioned, that
attempt forces those of us who are opposed to this effort to
galvanize into an effective political coalition in order to check
that thrust or parry. The problem is that some of us, as a
matter of human preference, prefer not to spend our time
engaged in political battles or engaged in the political process.
My definition of "rights" is useful because it deals with a
situation that I think may apply to a lot of AmericansRichard Nixon described them as the "silent majority"-who
are disengaged from the political process entirely or almost
entirely. These people live in rural regions, such as upstate
New York, and do not like coming to Washington very much,
preferring a bucolic, pastoral lifestyle. I would call this a right
to prefer other things to politics, be it family, reading,
parcheesi, or even MTV. I would elevate this preference right
to the status of any other right. This right to live a private life
of enterprise, disengaged from the political process, is gravely
endangered when everything is put on the table and when
individuals cannot rely solely on the Constitution to protect
their rights.
I would now like to talk about the arguments in favor of
elevating economic rights to a more dignified constitutional
status. Certainly, noneconomic rights, such as freedom of
speech, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and
freedom of peaceable assembly, are very significant. The most
common reason offered for the elevation of these noneconomic rights to special dignity is that, as economists would
say, positive externalities are associated with these rights.

However, I would suggest that the same can be said of

- THE FEDERALIsr

No. 10 (James Madison).
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economic rights.
As a basic principle of economics, when people form
contracts, the positions of parties to those contracts are
improved in ways that are easy to specify. In fact, these ways
are far easier to specify than are the ways that people's
positions are improved by, say, the right to engage in pornography or the right to other forms of free speech. In other
words, for a variety of reasons as catalogued in my article
entitled Some Causes and Consequences of the Bifurcated Treatment
of Economic Rights and "Other" Rights Under the United States
Constitution, I would suggest that a strong argument can be
made that economic rights are as worthy of protection as
noneconomic rights. Economic rights are a particularly fragile
sort of right because of the incentive of politically motivated
actors to go to the political process for the purpose of
obtaining wealth transfers. Economic rights are also particularly important because they are the only rights that allow people
to exercise the parallel right of being able to disengage
themselves from the political process if they so choose. Finally,
economic rights are the only rights that, when exercised, have
meaningful costs for the economic actor. When I exercise my
economic right to buy a piece of property, to make an
investment, or to enter into and to bind myself by a contract,
I directly suffer the economic consequences of that action. In
fact, I suffer the consequences to a far greater extent than I
do when I engage in noneconomic activities like free speech
or even voting in a large democracy in which the probability
of my particular vote affecting the outcome is, if not zero, very
close to zero.
For all the reasons that I have discussed this morning, I
would suggest that we re-examine that Supreme Court term of
1937 and maybe give some serious thought to the idea of
carving out a sphere of economic rights. Thank you.
VIRGINIA A. SEITZ*
Good morning. I am a member of this panel because I am
one of the attorneys representing the AFL-CIO in several cases
' Jonathan R. Macey, Some Causes and Consequences of the Bifurcated Treatment of
Economic Rights and "Other' Rights Under the United States Constitution, 9 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y
141 (1992).
* Attorney, Bredhoff & Kaiser, Washington, D.C.
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involving individual economic rights before the Supreme
Court this term: General Motors Corp. v. Romein,' in which the
Contract Clause is at issue, and Yee v. City of Escondido2 and
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council43 in which the Takings
Clause is at issue.
The first point that I would like to make is that the
Supreme Court's treatment of economic and noneconomic
constitutional rights is seemingly on the threshold of change.
This development is not something about which a union
lawyer would necessarily be happy or unhappy. Problems often
arise when individual noneconomic rights are given preference
while one is trying to represent the interests of a group.
Therefore, for the labor movement, heightened scrutiny of
individual noneconomic rights has not always been a benefit.
In any event, we see that this framework is about to be
significantly altered. The interesting question is how the order
will change, and the answer to this question will depend on
which of two schools of conservative thought prevail.
During all the years that conservatives spent in the
wilderness, they were perceived as espousing a theory that
rejected only half of the post-Lochner order. Many conservatives, including Justice Scalia and Judge Bork, expressed
agreement with the Court's rejection of Lochner and espoused
the view that judicial action on behalf of individual economic
rights, including the particular version of economic rights
inherent in laissez-faire capitalism, is antidemocratic. However,
this group of conservatives rejected the other half of the postLochner order-the excessive, in their view, protection of
individual rights. This school of conservative thought believed
that judicial restraint was in order no matter what the nature
of the constitutional right at issue and that liberal, activist
judges were acting wrongly, not because their decisions were
unpopular with conservatives, but because such activism was
antidemocratic.
A second strain of conservative thought is offered by those
who never bought the argument for judicial passivity. These
112 S. Ct. 1105 (1992).
2 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).

3 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
4 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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conservatives, most prominently Professors Epstein and Siegan,
make the case for increased judicial activism on behalf of
individual economic rights as they conceive of such rights.
This group's notions of contractual freedom and property
rights are based on its interpretation of the intent of the
Framers, America's libertarian traditions, the common law of
the eighteenth century, and on so-called empirical evidence
demonstrating that government regulation of the economy is
harmful to consumers, owners, and workers.
A vigorous debate is presently occurring among conservatives. These conservatives favor either judicial restraint, a
position comfortable and compelling when the Court was once
dominated by liberals, or a renewed, judicial activism on
behalf of individual economic rights, a position more attractive
now that conservative judges dominate and will continue to
dominate the Court for some years. I will readily admit that
this tension between principle and power is hardly unique to
any particular political position. I work with many liberals who
are now hoisting the banners of precedent and restraint, but
who all favored judicial activism when the reins were in their
hands.
For me, the most interesting question is which school of
conservative thought will prevail. I believe that the tension that
exists among conservative groups and within individual
conservatives is reflected in the Supreme Court's docket and
in its handling of the cases that I mentioned earlier. In my
view, petitions for certiorari were granted in General Motors,
Yee, and Lucas, because some Justices viewed these cases as
opportunities to breathe new life into the Contract Clause and
into the Takings Clause. Arguments from these perspectives
intrigued the Court and resulted in the granting of the
petitions for certiorari in these cases. However, after General
Motors was briefed and the original intent of the Framers
thoroughly argued and examined by both sides, the Court
simply determined that the Michigan act at issue did not
create a contract protected by the Contract Clause. Likewise,
the Court in Yee held that the regulations at issue did not
cause a physical taking and never reached the far more
interesting and complicated regulatory takings question. The
oral argument in Lucas has suggested that the Court's decision
may be rooted in ripeness grounds.
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I am not saying that the Court has not had legitimate,
prudential reasons to avoid taking the plunge and asserting a
new approach to individual economic rights. I am saying that
the tension within conservative thought between generalized
judicial restraint and judicial activism on behalf of individual
economic rights has made the Court's willingness to bite the
bullet more problematic.
I also believe that this tension will have a second significant consequence. I predict that any enhanced protection of
individual economic rights will not raise such rights to the
current elevated status of noneconomic constitutional rights
but will instead manifest itself in a heightened means-ends
scrutiny, akin to that which Justice Scalia utilized in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission.5 While alarmist liberals, such as
myself, will argue that this approach is the equivalent to a
return to Lochner, in many cases we will be wrong. A substantial difference between heightened means-ends scrutiny and
judicial review of the appropriateness of the ends of economic
legislation does exist in theory and clearly should exist in
practice.
In a less controversial vein, I also predict that the Court in
the future will give somewhat more deference to government
regulation that is said to impinge on noneconomic constitutional rights. The practical consequence of both of my
predictions is that the levels of protection accorded to
economic and noneconomic constitutional rights will draw
somewhat closer together, but that diminished differential
treatment will not disappear beneath a wave of conservative
jurists. The distinction will remain, in part due to inertia, in
part because good reasons exist for its continuance, and in
part because many of the arguments against the dichotomy are
without merit.
I always feel that the deck is somewhat stacked against me
when I discuss, with the disciples of the law and economics
school or with public choice theorists, whether noneconomic
constitutional rights should be favored over economic rights.
Individuals who believe that the world is best described as a
struggle for control over material resources and that the world
is best served when the market is left relatively unfettered
5 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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naturally believe that economic rights protected by the
Constitution are of central importance and have been undervalued by the Court. Leaving this aside, I believe, as Professor
Macey states, that economic rights and freedoms, such as
property rights, have played a critical role in securing the
other noneconomic rights upon which some individuals, like
myself, place a higher value. Some security in property allows
individuals to feel protected from the power of others, to
express themselves, and to feel more in control of their lives.
The critical question is how much economic liberty is
necessary to secure these other noneconomic rights? The
answer to this question is neither self-evident nor simple.
Because economic rights, such as property and contract rights,
are defined by government in the first instance, these rights
cannot exist without government interference with economic
liberty. What is meant by "economic liberty?" Is economic
liberty the freedom to monopolize or the freedom to sell
people things that are bad for them, such as cocaine? What
types of transactions are permissible and what techniques of
bargaining are permissible within permissible transactions? Is
fraud permissible? Society first must define "economic liberty"
by collectively deciding what goods are entitled to the status of
secured entitlement. Society must provide a set of baselines.
Once we agree, as we all do, that some limits are necessary, we
must make a collective judgment about where to stop. The
justification for protecting economic rights, such as property,
is that these rights allow people to effectively exercise their
noneconomic rights, and that the free exercise of such rights
will create the optimal nation. If one assumes that secure
possession of some property is prerequisite to the effective
exercise of noneconomic freedoms, then what becomes of
those who are free but who do not possess or are unable to
accumulate property because they have no skills and no assets?
These individuals are indeed in a poor position to exercise
their other rights. Perhaps the fact that economic rights are so
important may be used to justify some redistribution of these
rights to assure that all people have some minimum level of
assets so that they are truly able to exercise their noneconomic
rights.
I do not know exactly how much economic liberty is
essential to the preservation of other liberties that I consider
more fundamental, but I am not persuaded that the required
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amount of economic liberty is the same as was present in
eighteenth-century America. Property and contract rights have
been redefined in many different ways since the founding,
most notably in the eighteenth century when significant
changes occurred to make the Industrial Revolution possible.
Unless one is an originalist, which I am not and which is yet
another critical debate, I see little reason to want judges to
decide which school of economists-proregulation or antiregulation-is correct.
To this point, I have made an argument for judicial
restraint only with respect to economic rights. Why should we
have heightened judicial scrutiny of governmental regulation
of noneconomic rights? I have at times been a supporter of
the process theorists, such as Professor Ely, who argue that a
preference for enhanced scrutiny is justified for those rights
that ensure the integrity of the political process narrowly
defined. This distinction is helpful but is not fully explanatory
of the Court's decisions. I believe that the real reason for the
Court's differing scrutiny of economic and noneconomic
rights is a practical one. The state must regulate economic
affairs, even if only minimally. Without some regulation, only
a Hobbesian world with no markets, with no enforceable
bargains, and with no restrictions on fraud can exist. The state
must regulate conflicting private economic interests, enforcing
some and disallowing others. Once the state gets into the
regulatory business, the Court is unable to perceive any
sensible constitutional line to draw in allowing and disallowing
economic regulation and feels ill-suited to the task of evaluating conflicting claims about the merits of economic statutes.
However, no comparable necessity exists for government
regulation, ab initio, of noneconomic constitutional rights,
such as freedom of speech and freedom of religion. This
relative need, or lack thereof, for governmental regulation is
seemingly the source of the Court's differing scrutiny of
economic and noneconomic rights, but the depth of the
distinction requires further elaboration.
I will conclude with a heartfelt point. Public choice theory,
as set forth by Professor Macey, rests on an extraordinarily
cynical premise-that, in their public lives, people are engaged
solely in a scramble for resources and that all else is a facade,
a cover-up for this basic reality. Let us take this premise and
turn it on public choice theorists. Do public choice theorists
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engage in a scramble for resources by espousing a popular
theory at precisely the time that much prestige and many
appointments from conservative administrations can be gained
by doing so? Of course they don't. Public choice theorists take
such a position because they believe that their ideas are true
and that a general recognition of their truth will make the
constitutional system work better for all of us, not for just a
particular interest group. I hold differing beliefs for the same
reason. We must take each other's ideas seriously. Human
beings are complicated. We scramble for resources in public
life, but we are motivated by much more. We cannot run away
from this reality. We collectively believe that we are better
when we act for reasons other than or in conflict with our
economic self-interest, and our constitutional framework has
come to reflect this collective belief. Thank you.
GARY S. LAWSON*
One of the most interesting intellectual developments of
recent years is the rise of departmentalism: the view that each
department of the national government has an independent
and coequal obligation to interpret the Constitution.' According to this vision, the courts are not bound by the views of the
President and Congress, and the President and Congress are
not necessarily bound by the views of the courts (except,
perhaps, by an obligation to obey particular judgments). This
diffusion of interpretative responsibility, as with diffusion of
other forms of governmental power, serves to limit the
effective scope of national authority. A departmentalist federal
government cannot act unless all three departments agree that
the action is lawful.
In the case of Congress, that obligation to interpret the
Constitution extends to all of the provisions of the Constitution that affect congressional powers, but most obviously
extends to the enforcement provisions of various amendments.
In particular, the obligation extends to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which reads that Congress is empowAssociate Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
'See generaUy The Federalist Society, Who Speaks for the Constitution? The Debate

over Interpretive Authority (1992).
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ered "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article."2 My inquiry here is whether the powers of
Congress under this provision to interpret the substantive
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment differ in any respect
from the interpretative powers of courts.
My tentative and, for the moment, somewhat cryptic
answer is that those powers of Congress are similar to those of
the courts in most respects, but different in one subtle respect
that is almost never discussed. Before I explain that answer,
though, I want to clear up one substantive misconception
about the scope of Congress' powers under Section 5 that has
polluted the legal scene over the last quarter century. In the
best tradition of academics, let me start with an apparent non
sequitur.
Consider the Hobbs Act,- a federal criminal statute that
prohibits robbery or extortion that "in any way or degree
obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any
article or commodity in commerce .

.

." The statute then

goes on to define commerce to mean interstate or foreign
commerce. The constitutional source of this statute is plainly
the Commerce Clause, which empowers Congress "to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes .... 5
In accordance with the principle of enumerated federal
powers, the statute's source limits its potential scope. Congress
has constitutional power to regulate only interstate or foreign
commerce; if a robbery or an act of extortion does not involve
interstate or foreign commerce, then Congress cannot regulate
or punish the activity. And before you laugh at the notion of
limits on Congress' Commerce Clause power in this day and
age, you should know that a strangely neglected line of
modern Hobbs Act cases, which includes circuit court decisions from the 1980s, squarely holds that certain extortionate
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. There are similar enforcement provisions in seven
other amendments. See id at amend. XIII, § 2; id at amend. XV, § 2; id at amend.
XVIII, § 2; id at amend. XIX, 1 2; id. at amend. XXIII, § 2; id at amend. XXIV, § 2; id.
at amend. XXVI, § 2.
3

4

18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988).
Id

'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. More precisely, the statute is a law that is "necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution [the commerce power] ...
" Id at art. I, § 8,
cl. 18.

1993]

CONGRESS AND THE COURT

transactions fall outside the constitutional 6power of Congress
to regulate under the Commerce Clause. Contrary to what
you all learned in your constitutional law classes, the doctrine
of enumerated powers is alive, well, and functioning, provided
that you are a robber or extortionist, which is very convenient
for Congress.
So suppose that a federal prosecutor tries to apply the
Hobbs Act to a robbery or an extortion that does not, in fact,
obstruct, delay, or affect interstate commerce. Can the
government defend the prosecution by saying: "Okay, we grant
that this particular transaction is not really within the government's constitutional power. But in order to assure that the
government reaches all of the transactions that are within its
power, it must pass deliberately overbroad legislation that
covers an entire class of transactions. Some of those transactions will be within the government's constitutional powers,
and some transactions will not. In order to cover the entire
field, however, the government must legislate broadly to nail
them all."
Obviously, this reasoning is not a sufficientjustification for
jailing the person whose conduct falls outside the scope of the
Commerce Clause power. At a minimum, the government
cannot apply an overbroad piece of legislation to someone
whose conduct falls outside the scope of Congress' jurisdiction. At a maximum, the government cannot pass the statute
in the first place.7 What could possibly be clearer or simpler
than this?
' See, ag., United States v. DiCarlantonio, 870 F.2d 1058, 1060-61 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied 493 U.S. 933 (1989); United States v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020, 1023-25 (7th Cir.
1982). But see United States v. Farrell, 877 F.2d 870, 875-76 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 922 (1989); United States v. Anderson, 809 F.2d 1281, 1286 (7th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Wright, 797 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987). These
holdings are clearly based on constitutional rather than statutory analysis. The Supreme
Court has stated, in oft-quoted dicta, see, &g., Mattson, 671 F.2d at 1023, that the Hobbs
Act displays "a purpose to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish
interference with interstate commerce by extortion ....
Stirone v. United States, 361
U.S. 212, 215 (1960). A holding that a Hobbs Act prosecution fails for lack of a
sufficient nexus to interstate or foreign commerce is thus necessarily a holding about
the scope of the Commerce Clause, and the circuit courts that have dismissed
prosecutions on this ground have readily acknowledged the constitutional foundations
of their decisions.
This raises the difficult question-which need not be answered here-whether
statutes must be constitutionally valid in all applications in order to be valid in any. See
generallyJohn Harrison, The Free Exercise Clause as a RuleAbout Rules, 15 HARV.J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 169 (1992).
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Now consider Congress' power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. By its terms, that enumerated power
is the power to enforce the substantive provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, such as Section .' Therefore, a
necessary jurisdictional predicate for the exercise of Congress'
Section 5 power is an actual or potential violation of some
other provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. If conduct by
a state does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress'
power under Section 5 simply does not reach that conduct any
more than Congress' power under the Commerce Clause
reaches intrastate transactions. If Congress passes overbroad
legislation that purports to prohibit state action that does not,
in fact, violate the Fourteenth Amendment, then, at a minimum, that legislation cannot be applied to state conduct that
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Once again,
what could possibly be clearer or simpler than that?
As most of you know, however, a consistent line of
Supreme Court cases, dating back to Katzenbach v. Morgan9
and continuing into the 1980s holds that, under Section 5,
Congress can indeed prohibit state action that does not
actually violate the Fourteenth Amendment. This doctrine is
remarkably silly--and dangerous. For example, police have
authority to enforce the criminal law, but they are not entitled
to lock up innocent people in the course of punishing the
guilty. By the same token, Congress is not entitled to prohibit
constitutionally innocent state action in the course of remedying constitutional violations. Power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment means the power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, and nothing more.
Thus, a predicate to any congressional action under
Section 5 is a violation of some substantive provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The question here is whether the
interpretative authority of Congress, under Section 5, to
determine when a violation of the substantive provisions of the
s U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
' 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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Fourteenth Amendment has taken place might differ from the
interpretative authority of courts.
The object of constitutional interpretation, for any
political actor, is to discover the true meaning of the relevant
Constitutional provisions and to act accordingly. The problem
is that truths about the meaning of, for example, the Fourteenth Amendment do not have the self-evident status of
principles of Aristotelian logic. Therefore, anyone who puts
forward a claim about the true meaning of the amendment
has to be prepared to justify that claim in accordance with
sound epistemological principles of justification.
As a formal matter, any theory of justification has three
elements, which are familiar to all lawyers. You have to know
what counts as evidence for or against a proposition; you have
to know how much those things count for or against your
claim; and you have to know how weighty the evidence must
be at the end of the process in order to justify a definitive
judgment of truth or falsity. In the lingo of lawyers, you need
rules of admissibility, rules of significance, and a standard of
proof." These elements are familiar to anyone who has ever
had to prove a fact in a court of law.
There is no reason to think that the relevant rules of
admissibility and significance for interpreting the Constitution
should be any different for courts and legislatures-or, for
that matter, for executives. An interpretative rule of admissibility or significance is appropriate if and only if it is the best
available means for determining the Constitution's objective
meaning. For example, I believe that a theory of original
public meaning is the correct theory of interpretation for
courts, not because of some institutional feature of courts, but
because originalism, properly applied, yields propositions
about the constitutional text that happen to be true. Originalism performs this truth-identifying function for courts,
legislatures, presidents, and citizens. In other words, admissibility and significance rules for constitutional interpretation do
not depend on institutional roles or factors.
However, the third element of a theory ofjustification, the
standard of proof, might in fact vary depending on the role of
the interpreter. As lawyers, we are used to thinking about
"0See Gary Lawson, Provingthe Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 859, 867-71 (1992).
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proving facts, but are not used to thinking about proving the
law. Therefore, lawyers pay almost no attention to the problem
of how much evidence is required to justify a claim about legal
meaning. However, as I have elsewhere argued at length,"
this sufficiency of the evidence question cannot be avoided.
Consider this problem in the context of Section 5. Given
that a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is a jurisdictional predicate for action under Section 5, how certain must
it be that a violation of Section 1 has taken place before
Congress can act? I intend here only to pose this question, not
to answer it. But it is possible to imagine a plausible constitutional regime in which the answer is in fact different for
different constitutional actors. A very famous 1893 article on
judicial review by James Thayer suggests that courts are
entitled to disregard legislation only "when those who have the
right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have
made a very clear one,- so clear that it is not open to rational
question."1 Thayer's articulation is often called the "clear
statement rule" ofjudicial review. Under this principle, courts
that are called upon to decide directly whether a state has
violated Section 1-for example, in a Section 19833 lawsuit-should invalidate the state action only when convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the action is unconstitutional.
This standard of proof is clearly driven by normative considerations about the appropriate institutional role of courts. But
if institutional roles can be relevant in selecting a standard of
proof, then whether one can or should adopt the same
standard of proof for Congress under Section 5 is not at all
obvious. Perhaps a Thayerian Congress can conclude under
Section 5 that a state action violates the Fourteenth Amendment (or is in fact state action) merely on the basis of a
preponderance of the evidence concerning constitutional
meaning. This would yield a system in which Congress and the
courts apply exactly the same interpretative theory--that is, the
same rules of admissibility and significance-to the Fourteenth
Amendment, but Congress legitimately has the authority to
invalidate state laws that the courts must uphold.

" See ia at 861-77.
"James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw,

7 HARV.L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
"342 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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I do not necessarily endorse Thayer's normative analysis.
Indeed, I think that a case can be made that Thayer has it
exactly backwards, and that courts should invalidate governmental action (or at least federal governmental action) unless
the action is constitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, that inquiry is more or less incidental here. The
trick is to start thinking, at least generally, about the problem
of standards of proof for constitutional interpretation, and in
particular about how those standards play out in the context
of Section 5 and various institutional roles. Asking these
questions is useful even if, as in my case, you do not quite
have the answers yet. Thanks very much.
WALTER DELLINGER*
"In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most
incident to republican government."1 So wrote James Madison
in The FederalistNo. 10. Because I agree with so much of what
Gary Lawson said, I want to put in a broader context the role
and power of Congress in enforcing and protecting
rights-both economic and personal. This power traces its
lineage to Madison, The FederalistNo. 10 and the Constitutional
Convention at Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. As those
who frequently attend meetings of The Federalist Society are
well aware, one of Madison's unique contributions to the
science of politics was to turn the traditional political science
of his day on its head. The traditional political science said
that representative government would work only in a very
small republic and that large empires needed autocratic rule.
Madison believed that the diseases of republican government-populist control, mobocracy, and factions imposing
their will on others-could be remedied in the extended
republic. His great argument for a national republic was that
extensive republics are most favorable to the protection of the
public will. If you "[e]xtend the sphere [of government], and
you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make
it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens .
2

" Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).

2 1&
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Madison spoke of both economic and noneconomic liberties
when he made this central point:
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate
into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the
variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure
the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage
for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division
of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be
less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it .... 3

Madison's precursor to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, far more vast in nature, was his proposal to the
Constitutional Convention that Congress be given a veto over
all state laws. The "congressional negative" was Madison's
favorite constitutional project. He thought that the populist
democracy in the states could be remedied and that protection of economic and noneconomic rights could be secured
only by giving an extended national government the authority
to veto state laws. For a time, he prevailed in the Convention
until the practical difficulties of suspending the operations of
state laws, pending approval or rejection by Congress, swung
over enough states to narrowly defeat his project.
The consolation prize was the Supremacy Clause, which
was offered up by Luther Martin of Maryland and which
provided that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby. . . ." Therefore, to the extent that
constitutional limits on states exist and to the extent that
Congress acts affirmatively, Congress can displace state laws
though it has no negative or veto. Madison did not consider
this adequate and wrote to Jefferson that the great flaw in the
Constitution, the great lack, was the absence of the negative
on state laws. The problem was that there were so few constraints placed on state laws in the Constitution, and that the
jurisdictional authority of Congress-at a time when our
nation did not have an interdependent economy-seemed so

S1d.
4 U.S. CONS]r. art. VI,

cl. 2.
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slight that no basis existed for rejecting or supplanting the
laws of the states through affirmative congressional legislation.
To a large degree, and we don't know whether Madison
would have been more or less happy, the Civil War and the
Fourteenth Amendment provided, in a sense, a modern
national negative on the laws of the states. That development,
and the enhancement of the Commerce Clause power through
an increasingly interdependent economy, have allowed
affirmative congressional legislation to displace state laws. If,
as is sometimes suggested, the judicial branch invalidates all
actions of Congress empowered under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, except those in which the Court,
acting independently, would have invalidated a state or local
law or practice as a violation of Section 1, then the Congress
must sit and wait to conform its reading of the great charter
of the Fourteenth Amendment to precisely what the courts
would have done. This would be an ahistorical and judicially
centered view of the roles of courts and of Congress.
The Fourteenth Amendment makes a lot more sense if
you read it from the standpoint of the national legislature,
which, of course, includes the President in his veto or signing
capacity. When you read this amendment from the perspective
of a newly appointed member of the judiciary, you open up
your controlling guide as a member of the judiciary, and your
guide tells you that no state shall abridge or oppose the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.
Well, the first thing you do is turn to the back of the guide for
the appendix-expecting to find many of those privileges and
immunities. When you find no appendix, you wonder what
kind of job you've been given. Your guide says that no state
shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizenship but
provides no list of what those are. The guide also declares that
no state shall deprive any person of the equal protection of
the laws, nor deprive a person of life, liberty, or property
without due process, without telling us what those concepts
mean. As an instruction to judges, the controlling guide-the
text of the Fourteenth Amendment-seems utterly inadequate.
Read in its proper historical setting, as a charter for the
actions of the national Congress to protect rights against local
and state infringement, the Fourteenth Amendment makes
much more sense as defining the boundaries within which
Congress may act itself. Only by historical accident do we have
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a judicially centered view of the Constitution. That accident
was precipitated by Congress' inaction in the face of what
seems, to many if not most Americans today, to be a manifest
violation of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment-the
continuing conduct throughout the first half of this century of
a regime of racial segregation and racial subordination by the
governments of the South in derogation of the Constitution.
Interestingly enough, the great accounts of Brown v. Board
of Education indicate that Justice Jackson was difficult to
persuade to join the Court's opinion. When Chief Justice
Warren first took Justice Jackson for a walk to tell him that he
had five votes and was looking for a unanimous Court, Jackson
said that he believed that the Southern system was in conflict
with the basic equality command of the Constitution. However,
Jackson also believed that the Thirty-Ninth Congress, which
proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, intended that Congress
itself should make the broad, social, empirical judgment that
the Southern system offended that equality command. Justice
Jackson believed that it was Congress' role to overturn Plessy v.
Ferguson,6 not the Court's with its more limited capacities to
make large social judgments.Jackson was ultimately persuaded
that Congress would not act and that the Fourteenth Amendment contains an irreducible, judicially enforceable, selfexecuting minimum. However, as Gerald Rosenberg has noted,
this judicial effort did not reach fruition until Congress itself
acted in 1964-65. The system of segregation was really ended
only when the national Congress carried out this clearly
"Tenth Federalist" vision of a national principle being used to
protect individual rights from local oppression. With the Court
having acted first in Brown, history gives us all the sense that
the Court is in the driver's seat.
I agree with Professor Lawson that state conduct violating
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a necessary
jurisdictional predicate for Congress to act under Section 5 of
the amendment and that Congress cannot change or alter the
meaning of the Constitution. I think that we are close to
agreeing as well, however, that what a court has said or
done-or what it feels the capacity to do-is not the same

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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thing as "the truth" about Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment or any amendment. My meaning may most easily
be seen in the case of the Thirteenth Amendment, which
abolishes involuntary servitude and which gives Congress the
power to enforce the amendment. One could read that
enforcement power strongly as allowing Congress to finish the
job, root and branch, by eradicating not only the physical
holding of persons in servitude but also all of the instances of
an entire system of segregation. A court would be faced with
an impossible task if asked to decide what aspects of racial
practice might constitute this entire system of segregation.
That a court would not enjoin or give money damages for a
racial practice, such as a denial of equal housing, would not
mean that the effect of the Thirteenth Amendment was
exhausted if Congress chose to make a legislative judgment
about what was and what continued to be a violation of that
amendment.
The capacity of Congress to make legislative judgments as
an institution places it on a very different footing from that of
a court. For example, the simple question at the heart of
Katzenbach v. Morgan7 is whether a group of persons can be so
ill-informed about politics and government that it may be
properly excluded from exercising the franchise. We might
agree that a state may not eliminate persons from voting
unless it advances a positive goal for the state, such as intelligent use of the ballot. A state legislature may exclude those
literate in Spanish but not literate in English based upon the
judgment that those literate in Spanish are not nearly as wellequipped to understand politics and government. That
judgment would constitute a valid differentiating basis upon
which the state could exclude them from the franchise, and a
court may properly defer to that state legislative judgment.
Congress is a legislature; consequently, it can exercise its own
judgment about the ultimately legislative, social-policy fact
assessment that those literate in Spanish are as sufficiently wellinformed as are those literate in English and that no legislative
governmental electoral goal is in fact advanced. If that is the
legislative conclusion of Congress, then the exclusion violates
the amendment. This congressional result differs from the

7384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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judicial determination, but I think that each result may be
independently defensible.
RESPONSE AND REPLY
MACEY: Let me make a couple of random comments with an
eye toward promoting conversation. I want to elaborate for a
moment on this idea of rights that I articulated earlier and to
suggest that another implication of that framework was to
draw a very sharp focus on the tension between democracy
and rights. As probably all of you know, Francis Fukuyama has
written a blockbuster best seller called The End of History and
the Last Man, in which he says that liberal democracy has
triumphed in the world and that the general consensus is that
liberal democracy is the way to go. I think that this is ajoining
together of two words that have very little in common. The
idea of a liberal regime-the first half of the characterization
"liberal democracy"-is founded upon the principle of respect
for rights, and a liberal is someone who believes in rights with
a great deal of flexibility about what constitutes such rights. Of
course, democracy is characterized by respect for majoritarian
rule. The Framers focused much of their attention on this
basic tension between the idea of rights and the idea of
democracy.
In my little excerpts from the Federalist Papers, I have
circled the exact passage from The FederalistNo. 10 that Walter
Dellinger brought to your attention, but I am not going to
read it to you again. However, I am going to focus your special
attention on a couple of the phrases therein and on the
following concerns of Madison. He said that if things don't
work out, we might have such terrible things as an abolition
of debts. Again, I think that this is clearly an idea that property rights and economic rights were to be protected and that
Madison was quite concerned about a wicked project like a
movement towards an equal division of property. As I think
Professor Dellinger suggested, this respect for economic rights
is an idea that is not alien to our constitutional underpinnings.
Finally, let me take two seconds and just say that I think
that The Federalist No. 78' suggests at least a starting point to
the inquiry of what role the judiciary should take in the
protection of rights. Thank you.
' THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).

1993]

CONGRESS AND THE COURT

SEITZ: One point that I thought was very interesting in
Professor Macey's article was that the way society talks about
things can certainly make a difference in the way things
actually happen or the way law actually develops. He sees as
very hopeful signs the development of The Federalist Society
and its very active role in law schools, the appearance of law
students and law clerks on both sides of the political spectrum,
and the major influence exerted by the manner in which
discourse occurs. I think that his observations are very true
and are evidenced by the way we briefed the Supreme Court
cases that I discussed earlier. In briefing Yee v. City of Escondido
the AFL-CIO hired an economist to help us to understand and
to make arguments that the economic choices made by the
legislature in that case were rational choices. Furthermore, we
attempted to demonstrate to the Court that it could not make
a judgment between one school of economists that thought
this was a completely irrational set of regulations, and a
second school of economists that could absolutely explain the
legitimate public purpose behind this regulation. The Federalist Society has moved the discourse; you have already succeeded on that level.
Let me offer a second example. When we briefed General
Motors Corp. v. Romein, I did extensive research into the history
of the Contract Clause, with specific emphasis on the Framers'
intent with respect to that clause and on what constituted a
contract at the time that the Contract Clause was framed.
Corporations were treated very differently at that time.
Corporations were sometimes treated as a privilege granted by
the state, and laws passed by the state often were not considered contracts. Therefore, we argued that the legislation in
Romein was not a contract within the meaning of the Contract
Clause. Once again, you have changed the discourse. For some
of the reasons that I talked about earlier, I do not necessarily
think these changes are good developments. However, I am
saying you have already changed the way we talk about things
and have changed the dialogue substantially. This influence
already constitutes a major change in how these rights are
going to be addressed in the future.
LAWSON: I just have two quick comments and then one
question for each of the property rights panelists. First, since
Professor Raoul Berger is in the audience, I have to say with
respect to Katzenbach v. Morgan that the real answer, of course,
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is that voting is not protected by Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment; it is protected by Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, by the Fifteenth Amendment, and possibly by the
Guarantee Clause. More generally, those of you who were here
yesterday may recall that Charles Rohl from the Center for the
Study of Public Choice asked members of a previous panel
whether they would select democracy or capitalism if forced to
choose between the two. Of course, all the panelists ducked
the question, but this panel seems to be much less inclined to
duck those kinds of questions. We have heard Jon Macey's
answer, and I agree with him entirely.
I have questions for each of the property rights panelists.
Jon, I just want to clarify the position that you are taking with
respect to economic liberties, which you discussed as an
undifferentiated whole. Are you saying that these liberties are
in fact protected by the Constitution, that they ought to be
protected by the Constitution, or that courts should protect
them whether or not they are protected by the Constitution?
Virginia, I wonder whether you really can maintain your
distinction between property rights and other rights. Even if
one grants your premise, as I and others would not, that
government defines property rights, can one really distinguish
property rights from speech and religion rights? After all,
restrictions on fraud are also restrictions on speech, as are
restrictions on libel. When we prohibit human sacrifices, we
may be restricting religion. If we can have prepolitical conceptions of speech, religion, bodily integrity, and the like that can
bind a government, why can't we also have prepolitical
conceptions of property that function in the same way?
DELLINGER: Just a quick note to perhaps try to stitch
together the two parts of this morning's discussion. While
admittedly difficult to imagine in the current political arena,
a long term role for Congress in protecting against local
oppression of rights could conceivably solve some of the
dilemmas that arise from our hesitancy to have the judiciary
make these judgments about what is or is not a valid public
purpose. I think that Virginia is right to say that the courts
may do a better job at means-ends analysis than they do at
defining the permissible ends or goals of government. As
Richard Stewart, the Assistant Attorney General and sometime
professor at Harvard, has stated, the federal government has

1993]

CONGRESS AND THE COURT

truly become, to some extent, "Madison's nightmare."2
Madison worried about factionalism that takes over a small
geographic area. Along these lines, Richard Stewart points out
the extent to which, within this great national government that
was supposed to have the broader interests, we now have these
slices that have been carved out and defined by a bureaucratic
agency, or a congressional subcommittee, or a configuration
of special interest groups that control that segment. I think
Stewart calls it "a faction-ridden maze of fragmented and often
irresponsible micropolitics within the government."'
In the economic as well as in the personal liberty area,
one can imagine and hope for a broader congressional role.
I recently had occasion to argue against the continuing
imposition of extravagant punitive damages awards on a
recurring and repeated basis arising out of the same transaction or the same series of transactions. This situation involves
cases that are brought in many different state courts. To
convince a court in any given state that its state should abstain
from granting any more punitive damages in this course of
conduct is virtually impossible. The courts know that the
money saved by curbing punitive damages awards in their own
state-rather than remaining available for people who will
become sick in the future-is simply going to go to attorneys
and claimants in other states. This area needs a national
action either by thejudiciary or by Congress. Indeed, Congress
has a legislative capacity about which courts may be hesitant
to support: To use Cass Sunstein's wonderful phrase, sometimes what you have is a "naked preference"-taking from A
and giving to B without actually serving a legitimate public
purpose.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
QUESTION: My question is for Professor Macey. Ms. Seitz
seemed to indicate that economic rights exist to enable us to
better fulfill our noneconomic rights-a functional definition,
so to speak, of economic rights. Do you agree with her
definition and, if not, what do you see as the purpose of
economic rights, and is this purpose or function different
from that of noneconomic rights?
2

Richard B. Stewart, Madisons Nightmare,57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335 (1990).

3 Id. at 342.
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MACEY: No, I don't agree that the purpose of economic rights
is to ensure that we can pursue noneconomic rights. However,
I do think that economic rights do serve that function. I think
that the point was best made byJohn Stuart Mill when he said
that, at the limit, if the government owns everything as a
matter of property law, then not all the freedom of the press
and popular constitution of the legislature would make this or
any other country free otherwise than in name. The idea
being conveyed here is that having free realms of economic
enterprises gives people the freedom to speak out. However,
I think that economic rights do much more than merely
facilitate the exercise of noneconomic rights. I think that all
rights-freedom of expression, freedom of association,
freedom of economic rights-are mechanisms for enabling
people to achieve some kind of human flourishing and
fulfillment. At the risk of sounding grandiose, I think that
rights elevate the human condition, and I think that economic
rights not only accomplish this for some people to an equal or
to a greater extent than do noneconomic rights, but also
accomplish it with less intrusion on others' rights.
QUESTION: I have a question for Professor Lawson. If faced
with the choice between democracy and capitalism, you
implied just a moment ago that capitalism is your preference.
In acknowledging such a preference, how can you properly
call yourself a federalist? My interpretation of the Federalist
Papers reveals a project of which the main purpose is selfgovernment-a primer in how people can govern themselves
and their affairs. Seemingly, the aim of the Federalist Papers
is self-government, and economics, though it is a very important aspect of self-governing, is but a means to that aim. If we
become capitalists instead of republicans, then are we still
disciples of James Madison?
LAWSON: You pose a very fair question that I think has a very
fair answer. I was present at the founding of The Federalist
Society, and the other founders can testify that I was ardently,
stridently opposed to the name "The Federalist Society." My
original choice was the "Society for Spontaneous Order." To
the great benefit of posterity, I lost.
RESPONSE: I appreciate your candor, but I think we should
be frank about that.
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LAWSON: I agree.
QUESTION: I have a question for Ms. Seitz. You admitted that
you do see a need for economic rights in order to exercise
noneconomic rights. You then went on to say that justification
exists for some sort of redistribution of wealth scheme in
order to allow the unfortunates to exercise these noneconomic
rights. I assume that this redistribution of wealth would
require an increase in my taxes, which then might decrease
my opportunity to come to this forum to engage in this
discourse. Apparently, you are somehow willing to decrease
the rights of some in order to increase the rights of others. I
wonder if you see noneconomic rights as some sort of zerosum gain or as infinitely expandable. In other words, you will
give my resources to someone who does not have such
resources so that person can buy more books and have better
freedom of speech. However, as a result, you are taking away
my opportunity to come here if I am unable to afford it.
SEITZ: Of course, I was assuming that some level of economic
rights-some ability to accumulate property or some accumulation of property-was necessary to any kind of effective
exercising of noneconomic rights. I was accepting that as a
premise. If my premise is true and if we want to create what I
would think of as the optimal nation, we have to ensure not
just that some minimal number of people can effectively
exercise their noneconomic rights but rather that all people
are actually exercising their rights effectively. Redistribution
might somehow be justified under such a condition. If you do
not believe that this condition justifies redistribution, then you
would believe in the legitimacy of allowing some group of
people to have the ability to effectively exercise their noneconomic rights and for another group to have no such
ability. I understand that a choice would have to be made
here.
RESPONSE: However, by the same token, you are coming out
and saying that you are willing to diminish the rights of those
from whom you take the resources.
SEITZ: Absolutely. Though, of course, I do not see economic
rights as the kind of undivided whole in which every cent you
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have is your right. I certainly do not see economic rights that
way.
QUESTION: My question is directed to Ms. Seitz. I do not feel
that your theories are close to reality, specifically with reference to contract law. In the Northeast, specifically NewJersey,
someone suing in court under contract law to collect a debt
must go into mediation. From my past experience, no matter
how much money is owed to you under a contract, the
mediator slashes the amount owed in half. Additionally, many
judges are being pulled away from civil law and are hearing
criminal cases because of the drug situation. In light of these
facts, how can your theory on contract law remain justified?
Possibly, I misunderstand your position.
SEITZ: I don't believe that I was necessarily espousing the
position that agreements legitimately made should not be
enforced. With respect to the Contract Clause, I did mention
that in General Motors Corp. v. Romein we argued that the
contract at issue between the UAW and General Motors went
beyond any notion of a contract as embodied in the Contract
Clause. That argument may or may not be controversial here.
I think that maybe we had a miscommunication.
QUESTION: My question is for Professor Lawson. Unfortunately, I have not really read the Fourteenth or the Fifteenth
Amendments since law school because neither comes up very
frequently in my practice. One possible argument in favor of
the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, assuming that voting is
incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, is that Congress
was not necessarily making a legal interpretation with respect
to the questions of admissibility and sufficiency of evidence
but rather was involved in making determinations as to the
actual social facts of the situation. One might argue that courts
are competent only to determine facts specific to a particular
controversy or case between two individuals and that the
courts must retreat when the questions to be answered involve
facts about society as a whole. Such broad policy determinations are within the special competence of the legislature and
are not interpretations of the law in the conventional sense.
What is your reaction to this type of argument?
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LAWSON: I don't buy this argument because of my substantive
conception of what Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
means. I think that the Equal Protection, Privileges and
Immunities, and Due Process Clauses, which seem cryptic at
first glance, actually have quite specific and determinant
meanings, and their meanings do not depend on such things
as social facts. You do not need factfinding of a policymaking
variety in order to tell whether a state practice does or does
not constitute a violation of Section 1. If you did need such
factfinding, then I think that the question would be very
interesting. In that case, I think that the legal interpretation
itself might depend in some way on institutional roles; the way
that a legislature would interpret might be different from the
way a court would interpret. I can't accept this approach
simply because I think that determinant rules are laid down in
the Fourteenth Amendment; an action either violates these
rules or it does not.
RESPONSE: Even in the clearest case, you will have mixed
questions of fact and law. If the case is a question of a
particular social practice or a particular practice endorsed or
codified in the law, then couldn't one still argue, regardless of
the clarity of the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, that a mixed question of law and fact exists and that
Congress may have a larger role in determining the answer to
that question? I believe that this argument would be especially
applicable to a case concerning voting rights and voter
qualification criteria.
LAWSON: An action violates the Fourteenth Amendment not
because of its effects but because of the nature of the action.
As John Harrison would put it, the Fourteenth Amendment is
a formal "rule about rules." The only tricky case is a state rule
or practice that is deliberately crafted in such a way that it
evades a constitutional stricture. For example, the Fifteenth
Amendment clearly prohibits state rules that restrict voting on
account of race. Suppose that, immediately after Reconstruction, a state had adopted a rule saying that anyone could vote
whose grandfather voted. On its face, this restriction is not
race-based; however, the true intent of the restriction is quite
obvious. In this kind of circumstance, maybe different roles
exist for courts and for legislatures, but, in other circumstanc-
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es, I do not think so. The only way that I could convince you
not to think that way would be to go through the substantive
provisions and to show you that the way you determine
whether something violates the Fourteenth Amendment does
not depend on that kind of factfinding, and such an undertaking is very nasty.
QUESTION: I have a question for Professor Macey. It is hard
to be against rights, particularly economic rights, but I am
wondering exactly where we would find these rights. Who is
going to decide for us what these rights are? If you conclude
that the legislature should describe these rights, then I have a
question for Professor Dellinger. Do the courts have a function to limit the legislature and its tyranny of the majority in
the description of economic rights, and where would the
courts look to define which rights are constitutional and which
rights are unconstitutional?
MACEY: I think that the question posed to me is a very close
cousin to the question that Gary Lawson put to me at the end
of his remarks. What is the source of economic rights, and
who protects them? As far as sources go, I believe that these
economic rights are prepolitical, just as I believe that the
noneconomic rights of assembly and expression, among
others, are prepolitical-certainly, in the American context,
prepolitical in the sense that these rights clearly existed as a
matter of philosophy and ideas prior to the framing. Additionally and more importantly, as I suggested in my incantation
from The Federalist No. 10, I think that the federalists believed
that these rights were going to be protected within the
governmental scheme that they designed. The Framers
intended that these economic rights would be protected
structurally. One of the consequences of my reading of rights
or of my belief that these economic rights ought to be
protected is that, at least since 1937, something has gone
wrong. Either the Framers screwed up, or I am wrong in my
reading because these rights presently are not being protected,
and this fact really gets to the gist of your question about who
protects economic rights. My answer is that the Framers
thought that these rights were going to be protected structurally. As described in the part of The Federalist No. 10 that
Professor Dellinger read, voting, bicamerality, and a variety of
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other aspects of the Constitution were going to protect these
rights. To date, these structural devices have not protected
economic rights. So, what do we do? Basically, I think that
everything is up for grabs based on The FederalistNo. 78, my
own view of how the constitutional structure works, and my
own beliefs about the way that the judicial system works. I
think that courts ought to protect economic rights because
obviously Congress is not doing so. Additionally, I think that
we should invoke an incremental, common law methodology.
I do not think that a ritualistic formula, whereby you plug in
your legal question at one end and the answer in every
instance comes out the other end, will effectively address the
problem. I believe that a long process of rebuilding the
jurisprudence that had been developed up to 1937 will be
necessary.
DELLINGER: Courts have a role in protecting individual
rights, even if the Court determines that the congressional
judgment is reasonable and defers to that congressional
judgment and even where the Court itself would not have set
aside a contrary state legislative judgment. For example, were
the Court persuaded by Professor Raoul Berger's view that
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not cover voting
rights, of course the Court would invalidate an act of Congress, predicated on the Fourteenth Amendment, setting aside
New York's franchise limitation. If Congress were to pass a
freedom of reproductive choice act invalidating, on a variety
of different theories, state restrictions on abortion and if
Congress included a provision that compelled physicians or
nurses to participate in those procedures against their religious beliefs or consciences, then, in my view, that provision
would be unconstitutional, and the Court would strike it down.
In 1956, if Congress had held that a system of rigid, stateimposed racial segregation involved no assertion of inferiority,
then I believe that Congress would have been making a
judgment about social facts that had no reasonable basis. Such
a judgment could properly be struck down by the Court.
EASTERBROOK Let me interject briefly. Part of the answer
that Professor Macey gave explains why he began his talk by
quoting, without complete approval I gather, from an article
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that I wrote called The Constitution of Business.' Professor

Macey says that property rights are prepolitical and that courts
should enforce them whether or not they are present in the
Constitution. His belief follows from the conclusion that the
Founders screwed it all up.
I am much more doubtful that the Founders blundered
through ignorance. Madison did not consider the power of
minority faction, but he was worried about majority faction.
Minority faction garnered great power in the United States as
a result of changes that were not possible to anticipate in
1787-the dramatic decrease in the cost of transportation and
the advances in communication which, at last, made this large
nation an integrated whole. These changes have made the
United States much more like a state was 200 years ago, in the
sense that people can communicate and trade readily with one
another. Change is not mistake. Fundamental social change
has consequences for the organization of government.
The jurisprudential issue, then, is what judges may do
about these consequences. Professor Macey and I have a large
disagreement. You would think that The Federalist Society,
which has insisted that Congress and the President be able to
justify their own behavior, would demand thatjudges also turn
to an affirmative source of authority for particular behavior.
Because judges are governmental regulators, just like everybody else, whence comes their authority to regulate?' If you
look around for the authority to regulate and no authority is
to be found, then the person claiming to act in the name of
the state should desist. We are left with democracy-political
solutions to today's problems. This realization is at the core of
a lot of the discussion and disagreement here.

' Frank H. Easterbrook, The Constitution ofBusiness, GEo. MASON U. L. REV., Winter
1988, at 53.
2 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 349, 371-80

(1992).

